INSIGHT

APRA's draft SPS 530 proposes far-reaching investment governance changes for super trustees

By Geoff Sanders, Stephanie Malon, Mimi Chester, Erik Pridgen
APRA Corporate Governance Financial Services Superannuation

11 min read

The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) recently released a consultation paper and draft Prudential Standard SPS 530 Investment Governance (SPS 530), proposing the most significant reshaping of superannuation investment governance requirements since it introduced the standard.

This Insight summarises the proposals and what trustees should be doing now.

Key takeaways

  • APRA has proposed eight changes to SPS 530: three new safeguards targeted at concentration risk, third-party conflicts and trustee capability, and five changes that APRA says 'codify' and, in places, sharpen supervisory expectations on investment onboarding, monitoring, remediation, valuations and accountability.
  • The proposals apply to all APRA-regulated superannuation trustees. Although we expect the greatest practical impact will fall on platform trustees and other member-directed models, all trustees will need to materially strengthen their investment governance if SPS 530 is remade in its proposed form.
  • Submissions on the consultation close 3 February 2027. APRA expects to finalise SPS 530 and draft accompanying guidance in the first half of 2027, with the new framework commencing 1 January 2028.

Snapshot of proposed SPS 530 changes  

Area Proposed change
Member-level investment limits Trustees must set and enforce limits on members' exposure to higher risk member-direct investment options (MDIOs), subject to a maximum holding limit imposed by APRA.  
Conflicts management   Trustees must identify, assess and manage conflicts in relation to third parties that provide services to, or that otherwise seek to influence investment menus of, the trustee (such as promoters and advisers).
Trustee capability and resources   Trustees must set and regularly review limits on the number, complexity, nature and risk profile of their investment menus so that the trustee can effectively and prudently onboard, monitor and oversee investments.  
Investment onboarding   Trustees must set and apply documented onboarding criteria covering fees, liquidity, valuations, stress testing, governance and conflicts. Effective due diligence must be conducted on each investment in the investment option (if internally managed) and on the investment option as a whole (if externally managed).  
Investment monitoring   Trustees must monitor investments against the same criteria for onboarding, and against performance benchmarks, and maintain a watchlist for heightened risks or other characteristics that may affect suitability.  
Intervention   Trustees must implement a time-bound action plan where a minimum tolerance or trigger identifies underperformance or emerging risk, and obtain active member consent to remain in an option that is subject to material or persistent concerns.  
Valuations   Trustees must value investments at least quarterly and obtain an external valuation if APRA directs.  
Accountability   The Financial Accountability Regime (FAR) accountable person for a trustee's investment function must give an annual attestation on investment governance adequacy and effectiveness.  

Why now

The proposals follow the Shield and First Guardian Master Fund collapses and APRA's broader work to strengthen investment governance in superannuation, its thematic review of platforms, and a suite of related reforms, as announced by Treasury on 19 August and as discussed in our recent Insight. Treasury had proposed to support APRA's ongoing platform governance work by providing APRA with the power to set risk-based capital requirements for superannuation trustees offering higher-risk investment options to their members. On the same day, APRA separately foreshadowed a package of reforms to 'lift investment governance standards across the superannuation industry'.

Following recent supervisory work and thematic review on governance, APRA has found that some platform trustees have treated investment governance as a compliance exercise rather than a core board responsibility. APRA has concluded that its existing principles-based standard has not produced consistent improvement and that firmer, more prescriptive minimum requirements are needed. These measures are broadly aligned with the expectations that APRA had called out to platform trustees in its letter to platform trustees of 7 October 2025.

Proposals in detail

Proposal 1: Member-level investment limits for 'higher-risk' investment options

APRA proposes to require trustees to set and enforce member-level investment limits for concentrated higher-risk investment options.

For this purpose, a few concepts have been defined:

  • an ‘investment option’ is defined as an option made available to a beneficiary of a registrable superannuation entity (RSE) for the investment of all or any part of their superannuation interest; ‘superannuation interest’ has the meaning given in section 10(1) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth); and
  • a member-direct investment option (MDIO) is defined as an investment option that allows members, whether advised or non-advised, to invest in specific investments such as shares, exchange traded funds, managed investment schemes, listed investment companies and term deposits.

Key features of the member-level investment limit are proposed as follows:

  • Draft SPS 530 proposes that trustees must, for each MDIO, determine and implement appropriate member-level investment limits.
  • The requirement to implement a diversification limit (ie, the maximum amount of each member's balance that would be able to be allocated to any individual higher-risk MDIO) would apply to all MDIOs unless the relevant trustee is positively satisfied that the option is lower risk. APRA is seeking feedback on an appropriate test for what a lower risk option might be, which is proposed in draft SPS 530 to include indicia that demonstrate that the option is: (a) highly liquid; (b) not significantly leveraged; (c) highly diversified or otherwise low risk (eg, indices or cash); and (d) backed by a well-established, well-capitalised counterparty.
  • Trustees would continue to be primarily responsible for setting their own diversification limits, but this would be subject to an APRA mandated absolute cap. In the consultation, APRA has floated an absolute cap of between 20% to 30% for each higher-risk option, although it emphasises that it is merely a preliminary view, and one on which it is seeking feedback.
  • The holding limit would apply at the point of any new acquisition or additional contribution rather than by forcing a sell-down of existing holdings, though it is proposed that trustees would have to engage with members who have materially or persistently exceeded a holding limit and explain options to manage their exposure.
Proposal 2: Conflicts involving advisers and promoters

Draft SPS 530 proposes that, in addition to the current obligations imposed on superannuation trustees to manage their own conflicts of interest, trustees be required to look beyond their own conflicts to ensure they have actively considered how the commercial interests of the promoters, dealer groups and advisers they deal with might impact fund members. APRA explains that the proposal is intended to require trustees to consider 'not only conflicts within their own operations, but also conflicts of third parties they deal with', and to actively manage those third-party conflicts.

Proposal 3: Trustee capability, resources and investment oversight

APRA has proposed additional requirements in draft SPS 530 requiring trustees to ensure capabilities, resources and governance arrangements, including personnel with appropriate skills and expertise, systems and technology, are commensurate with the number, complexity, nature and risk profile of their investments and investment options.

APRA expects this proposal may force trustees to choose between strengthening their capability and simplifying their investment menu, and notes that 'where investment options are added or retained without considering the overall size and complexity of the menu, menus can become too large to govern well'.

Proposal 4: Codifying investment-onboarding requirements

Trustees would need to set, document and apply criteria for onboarding investments and investment options that cover key risk and performance matters, fees, liquidity, valuations, stress testing, governance, external product assessment information, the capabilities and the track record of any external party responsible for the investment management and conflicts of interest. ‘Onboarding’ is defined to include selecting investments for inclusion in an investment option and deciding to offer an investment option.

APRA says it expects a greater degree of examination and look-through for an unlisted managed investment scheme (as opposed to a listed ETF, where the underlying investments are highly transparent).

Proposal 5: Codifying investment monitoring requirements

APRA proposes that trustees must determine, document and implement measures for monitoring the investment performance of each MySuper product and each investment option (plus each investment included in an investment option, where the investment option is internally managed).

Trustees would need to monitor investments against the same criteria used at onboarding, on an ongoing basis, as well assess:

  • changes in investment style or strategy;
  • governance concerns;
  • adverse developments, regulatory action, media coverage or other information relating to the investments in internally and externally managed investment options, or the adequacy and effectiveness of the external party’s ongoing monitoring processes; and
  • unusual fund or adviser-related flows (such as switching between investments or investment options).

Trustees will also be required to establish and maintain a watchlist for investment options and investments where monitoring has identified heightened risk or other characteristics that may affect their continued suitability.

Proposal 6: Codifying requirements for taking action when performance or risk concerns arise

Proposed updates to SPS 530 will require trustees to take prompt and appropriate action when an investment underperforms or breaches risk thresholds, and to obtain active member consent before a member can remain invested in an option subject to material or persistent concerns, rather than remaining invested by default. APRA is also considering whether trustees should report to APRA on investments that remain on a watchlist for more than 12 months, and the regulator welcomes feedback on this potential reporting requirement.

APRA's rationale for this proposal was delayed remediation, which it said can be made worse where trustees place too much weight on maintaining adviser or promoter support, creating a bias towards retaining options despite concerns about their performance or suitability. This measure appears to be in alignment with the Treasury Factsheet released on 19 August 2026, in which it was proposed that APRA would have the power to direct superannuation trustees to commence a remediation process when an investment option fails and there is reason to suspect a failure of trustee obligations.

Proposal 7: Investment valuations

Trustees would need to value investments at least quarterly, and APRA could direct a trustee to obtain an external valuation where it has concerns about reliability. This is consistent with APRA’s focus on valuations in its 2026–27 Corporate Plan, which flagged that selected large trustees will have to appoint an independent party to undertake a deep-dive review of their valuation governance practices for unlisted assets. APRA intends to consider whether further guidance is needed to clarify the trustee’s responsibility to review, challenge and gather evidence where valuations are prepared by investment managers or related parties.

This proposal coincides with ASIC Report 841 Accounting for your super: Super fund financial reporting audit 2025-26 (REP 841), released on 14 October 2026. ASIC surveyed financial reports of 42 RSEs for the years ended 31 December 2024 and 30 June 2025 and made targeted valuation inquiries with some RSEs. Ultimately, ASIC found that most RSEs relied on external managers to provide valuation information (rather than applying independent scrutiny). ASIC considers that best practice is to maintain an appropriate level of independent review and challenge of these valuations.

Proposal 8: Strengthening accountability

Each person with a senior executive responsibility for management of the trustee's investment function (an accountable person under FAR) would need to give an annual attestation on the adequacy of investment governance arrangements, and the licensee would need to consider that attestation in determining variable remuneration.

Allens' view

Allens broadly supports improving investment governance for all trustees, particularly as good governance has been shown to have an important role in protecting members in the wake of the Shield and First Guardian Master Fund collapses.

However, our view is that APRA's proposed amendments to SPS 530 are in the very early stages of development and that substantial refinement is needed before the proposals are appropriately targeted.

In their current form, at least some of the SPS 530 changes are likely unworkable for many trustees given the (in our view) unnecessarily prescriptive nature of a number of the new requirements that will apply to trustees across the full spectrum of fund types and investment approaches.

In particular, there are a handful of initial high-level observations on the current draft that we hope will be carefully considered during the consultation process:

  • Overlapping terminology and unclear application across different fund structures, investment approaches and asset classes: While we would expect the more technical issues to be ironed out in the consultation process, a number of the new (and some of the existing) concepts used in SPS 530 are arguably vague and potentially overlapping. We appreciate that APRA has sought to approach the drafting of SPS 530 so that it operates (as far as possible) on a fund structure/investment approach-agnostic basis but, in doing so, the draft standard risks creating confusion for trustees as to APRA's expectations of investment governance standards as they apply to their particular business model. The current drafting also risks creating an inflexible 'one-size-fits-all' set of requirements across fund structures, investment approaches and asset classes. In our view, the material differences between market segments necessitate appropriately tailored approaches.
  • Unnecessarily prescriptive investment selection, monitoring and remediation obligations: In a similar vein, the newly 'codified' obligations imposed on trustees in relation to investment (and investment option) selection, monitoring and remediation are, in our view, unnecessarily prescriptive. While there is merit in clearly articulating APRA's baseline expectations in the standard, the current drafting overlooks the material differences between, for example, a platform onboarding a managed investment scheme as an option on its menu, a profit-for-member fund investing in a closed-ended private equity fund, and a retail fund's investment manager selling part of a holding in an ASX-listed security under its mandate as part of regular portfolio balancing.
  • Risks of making trustees responsible for the conflicts of third parties: Proposal 2 would impose a positive obligation on trustees to identify and manage conflicts involving third parties that provide services to, or otherwise influence, the trustee (eg, promoters, financial advisers and other third parties). This is an unusual step and arguably goes far beyond the standards ordinarily expected of a prudent trustee. We query whether APRA already has the tools available to address the conduct it is concerned with here in the existing (more traditional) conflict management requirements in the superannuation regime, along with some of the more fundamental duties, such as the best financial interests duty and the care, skill and diligence duty. If the requirements stay in some form, it will be important to ensure that any new APRA guidance does not inadvertently impose an indirect liability on trustees for the conduct of third parties.

Next steps

Submissions on the consultation paper and draft SPS 530 close 3 February 2027. Given the scope of changes proposed, we expect trustees (particularly platform trustees) will be keenly interested in engaging in the consultation process.

Please get in touch if you would like to discuss the proposals or need assistance in preparing a submission.